Iran will continue to enrich uranium regardless of whether a
Republican or a Democrat is America's president. At the same time, the
United States will oppose any Iranian nuclear program - even a civilian
program - because this will contribute to the stability of the regime
in Tehran. As a result, nuclear tensions are likely to bedevil
US-Iranian relations for years to come.
Iran, it is often claimed,
has no need for nuclear power, given its abundant oil and natural gas
reserves. But the Iranian government is under economic and political
pressure to supply increasing amounts of electricity to its growing
population and fragile economy.
Using oil or natural gas for domestic electricity threatens oil and gas exports, which are the principal source
of government revenues. Indeed, with domestic oil consumption growing
at a higher rate than production, government revenues from oil exports
are already in decline.
Thus, nuclear power will halt the decline in government revenues by
freeing more oil and natural gas for export. Iran's natural gas
resources, if developed, would not be a substitute for cheap nuclear
power, because gas is more profitable in other uses than in power
generation.
The Iranian government fears that electricity shortages,
slow economic growth, and high unemployment will turn the populace
against it. As social tensions increase, political turmoil will follow.
Nuclear power offers the possibility of cheap, plentiful
electricity, which will contribute to social and political stability.
Iranian experts argue that, in considering the trade-off between
internal unrest and external sanctions, the Iranian government must
choose between domestic security and international security.
Domestic pressure could very well bring down the regime, but
international pressure will not. History is on the side of the Iranian
government. The oil weapon, but this is highly unlikely. It is not in Iran's interest, under any scenario, to decrease oil exports, let alone halt them.
However, domestic pressure, a sense of nationalism, and the need to
improve its bargaining position with western countries might force the
Iranian government to respond to harsh UN sanctions
or an air attack on its nuclear facilities. But even under these
extreme circumstances, Iran will still need its oil revenue. A symbolic
cut or embargo, while possible, would have little impact on world oil
markets.
Iran's government has more effective options to respond to attacks
from the US and its allies. Its supporters in Iraq might cripple Iraqi
oil exports from Basra, which would damage US plans in Iraq while
boosting Iran's oil revenues, or limit the availability of fuel to the
US army by attacking roads and bridges, especially the Kuwait
City-Baghdad highway.
The world community will continue to pay a high price for the
nuclear standoff, which will cast a shadow over world oil markets for
years to come. Some argue that the issue has already raised oil prices
by about $15 per barrel.
Ironically, an Iranian civilian nuclear program would enhance US and
world energy security by making more oil and gas available in the
global market. But America's determination to destabilise Iran and the
Iranian government's determination to retain power reduce the
likelihood of this scenario.